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I.   INTRODUCTION
While driving down the interstate, you see the flashing lights of a
police cruiser in your rearview mirror. As you obediently pull over to
the side of the road, several questions race through your mind: “Was
I speeding?,” “Will I get a ticket or a warning?,” “How long will the
officer keep me?” Typically, most of these uncertainties will be re-
solved soon after the officer approaches your vehicle. However, one
question remains unanswered until you are told you may leave:
“When will this traffic stop end?”
Suppose further that the officer asks for your license, has you exit
your car and stand between it and the cruiser, and turns on a video
camera pointed at you. When the officer hands your license back to
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you, he tells you that, although you were indeed speeding, he is go-
ing to “cut you some slack” and let you off with a warning. Then,
with no break in the conversation, the officer ventures, “One ques-
tion before you get gone. [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in
your car? Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?”1 At
this moment, what are your options? Is it reasonable to infer from
these circumstances that you can simply ignore the officer’s query,
get in your car and leave the officer, who just showed you “some
slack,” in the dust? Apparently, the United States Supreme Court
believes that you may.2
In Ohio v. Robinette,3 the United States Supreme Court found
that facts similar to those above created an issue not of seizure, but
of consent. The Court then promptly rejected a per se requirement
that every detainee be warned that she is free to go before her con-
sent to search may be deemed voluntary.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing the opinion for a seven member majority, adhered closely to
both the letter and the spirit of well-established precedent concern-
ing consent to Fourth Amendment searches.5 Indeed, this holding
was so unremarkable that it generated a dissenting opinion from
only one justice.6 Thus, the answer provided by the Court in Robi-
nette would be perfectly proper if it addressed the question raised by
the facts in the case. Unfortunately, it did not.
In framing Robinette’s issue as one of consent, Chief Justice
Rehnquist glossed over a much more difficult question: whether the
predicate stop remained lawful at the time consent was sought. The
first sentence of the majority opinion set the analysis for the entire
case: “We are here presented with the question whether the Fourth
Amendment requires that a lawfully seized defendant must be ad-
vised that he is ‘free to go’ before his consent to search will be recog-
nized as voluntary.”7 By inserting the assumption of a lawful seizure
in the issue presented, Chief Justice Rehnquist distorted the Court’s
analysis from the outset. On its surface, the majority opinion sounds
                                                                                                                   
1. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996).
2. See id. at 420-21.
3. 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
4. See id. at 421.
5. See id. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421 (citing the Court’s prior refusal in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973), to mandate as a precondition to vol-
untary consent that persons be warned of their right to refuse consent to search).
6. See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 424 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 419.
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like nothing more than a simple reaffirmation of a principle deemed
fundamental for nearly a quarter of a century: warning requirements
have no place in the informal context of an officer’s request for con-
sent to search.8 However, the true question presented in Robinette is
the one asked by every motorist stopped on our nation’s roads:
“When will this traffic stop end?”
Part II of this Article examines the history behind the Court’s
current view of Fourth Amendment seizures of the person. Part III
critically examines the Supreme Court’s analysis in Robinette. Fi-
nally, Part IV offers proposed definitions to clarify the boundaries of
seizure of the person under the Fourth Amendment.
II.   THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
ISSUES RAISED IN OHIO V. ROBINETTE
A.   The Creation and Evolution of the Fourth Amendment Definition
of Seizure of a Person
Today’s core concepts about seizures of the person stem from
Terry v. Ohio,9 the first United States Supreme Court case to con-
front directly the issues of Fourth Amendment application to deten-
tions short of arrest.10 In Terry, Detective Martin McFadden, a
thirty-nine-year veteran of the Cleveland Police Department, ob-
served John W. Terry and Richard Chilton repeatedly walk past and
peer into the windows of a store on the detective’s beat, and then
confer with a third man.11 Detective McFadden suspected the three
of “casing a job, a stick-up” of the store, and therefore approached
and identified himself as an officer.12 When the suspects mumbled
their responses, Detective McFadden grabbed Terry, swung him
around, and patted down his outer clothing for weapons.13 Detective
McFadden’s patdown resulted in the recovery of a .38 caliber re-
volver which led to John Terry’s charge of and conviction for carrying
a concealed weapon.14
Detective McFadden’s stop and frisk of Terry presented the Court
with a choice of two extremes. One argument advanced the notion
                                                                                                                   
8. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231 (1973).
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. See id. at 4. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, noted: “We would be
less than candid if we did not acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult
and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive area of police activity—-issues which have
never before been squarely presented to this Court.” Id. at 9-10. For a thorough discussion
of Terry’s impact on individual freedom from seizures on the street, see Tracey Maclin,
The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990).
11. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5-6.
12. Id. at 6-7.
13. See id. at 7.
14. See id.
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that a stop and frisk was “outside the purview of the Fourth
Amendment because neither action [rose] to the level of a ‘search’ or
‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Constitution.”15 This view consid-
ered a stop or frisk to “amount to mere ‘minor inconvenience and
petty indignity.’”16 Indeed, one lower court roughly equated the
frisk’s “sense of exterior touch” to those of “sight or hearing—senses
upon which police customarily act.”17 At the opposite end of the spec-
trum was the view recognizing no legitimate police restraint absent
full probable cause: “There is not—and cannot be—a variety of police
activity which does not depend solely upon the voluntary cooperation
of the citizen and yet which stops short of an arrest based upon
probable cause to make such an arrest.”18
The Court in Terry aimed to steer between these two polar ex-
tremes. Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, determined
that the Court’s “first task is to establish at what point in this en-
counter the Fourth Amendment becomes relevant.”19 The Terry
Court then ventured to identify this point with the following defini-
tion of a seizure: “It must be recognized that whenever a police offi-
cer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he
has ‘seized’ that person.”20 Chief Justice Warren also noted,
“Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citi-
zens involves ‘seizures’ of persons. Only when the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has oc-
curred.”21
Due to a dearth of facts in the record, the Court refrained from
deciding whether Detective McFadden conducted a “seizure” prior to
physically touching John Terry.22 However, Terry involved the Con-
stitution at a stage earlier than full-blown arrest, amounting to a
rejection of the government’s contention that stops and frisks oc-
curred in an area of law outside of the Fourth Amendment.23 A
                                                                                                                   
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. at 10.
17. Id. at 11 n.5 (citing People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 447 (1964)).
18. Id. at 11. The Court elaborated on this contention by noting that “[t]he heart of
the Fourth Amendment, the argument runs, is a severe requirement of specific justifica-
tion for any intrusion upon protected personal security, coupled with a highly developed
system of judicial controls to enforce upon the agents of the State the commands of the
Constitution.” Id.
19. Id. at 16.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 19 n.16.
22. Chief Justice Warren noted: “We cannot tell with any certainty upon this record
whether any such ‘seizure’ took place here prior to Officer McFadden’s initiation of physi-
cal contact for purposes of searching Terry for weapons, and we thus may assume that up
to that point no intrusion upon constitutionally protected rights had occurred.” Id.
23. Chief Justice Warren flatly stated: “We therefore reject the notions that the
Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if
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driving force behind the Court’s broad definition of Fourth Amend-
ment seizure was a fear of unchecked police conduct. Chief Justice
Warren found the logic which distinguished between a stop and an
arrest of a person dangerous: “It seeks to isolate from constitutional
scrutiny the initial stages of the contact between the policeman and
the citizen.”24 Thus, in the very first case where the scope of consti-
tutional protection over stops was squarely addressed, the Court
emphasized the hazards inherent in unchecked governmental
authority.
Terry’s protection of detainees consisted of a twofold assessment
of reasonableness. Not only must governmental intrusion be
“justified at its inception,” but it must also be “reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.”25 Therefore, from the very first case directly handling the
sensitive issues presented in street detentions and frisks, the Court
stressed the importance of limiting the government power it had just
created to stop individuals on information falling short of probable
cause. Terry aimed to restrain law enforcement authority during de-
tentions by ensuring all police activity during the stop or frisk be an-
chored to the original reason for intrusion.26
                                                                                                                   
the officers stop short of something called a ‘technical arrest’ or a ‘full-blown search.’” Id.
at 19.
24. Id. at 17.
25. Id. at 20. Much of the Court’s discussion regarding the subsequent scope of gov-
ernment intrusion related to searches rather than seizures. For instance, Chief Justice
Warren noted: “This Court has held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its in-
ception may violate the Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and
scope.” Id. at 17-18. Further, “The scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified
by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Id. at 19. However, the
Court indicated the force of this logic applied to both searches and seizures, when, in re-
jecting the notion that stops and frisks are not subject to constitutional scrutiny, it of-
fered: “In our view the sounder course is to recognize that the Fourth Amendment governs
all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal security, and to make the scope of the
particular intrusion, in light of all exigencies of the case, a central element in the analysis
of reasonableness.” Id. at 17-18 n.15.
26. See id. at 19 (reaffirming its requirement that the scope of a search must be
“strictly tied to and justified by” the circumstances which rendered its initiation permis-
sible). Interestingly, Terry unwittingly locked in the structure of detention analysis for the
next three decades. The Court ever since has approached every investigatory detention,
despite Terry’s recognition of the “protean variety” of street encounters, with one query: at
what point during an encounter does the Fourth Amendment become relevant? Id. at 15.
This narrow focus has left an equally important inquiry unresolved: at what point during
an encounter does the Fourth Amendment cease being relevant? When does Fourth
Amendment protection stop? In short, when does a seizure of the person end? Terry, of
course, did not consider the end point of seizures because that question was not before the
Court. Yet, nothing in the majority opinion suggested that future courts should limit their
consideration of Fourth Amendment protection to a dogmatic recital of the initiation of
constitutional protection. This Article thus considers the definition of the end point of de-
tentions of the person.
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In Davis v. Mississippi,27 the next detention case after Terry, the
Court adhered to the essentials of its original analysis.28 Davis reaf-
firmed that the Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the per-
son, including those which involve only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest.29 The Davis Court echoed its original fear of expos-
ing citizens to police authority without constitutional protection:
“Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant
to prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our
citizenry, whether these intrusions be termed ‘arrests’ or
‘investigatory detentions.’”30
The next seizure cases visited by the Court are of particular sig-
nificance, for, like Robinette, they involved detentions of motorists.
In Adams v. Williams,31 the Court was faced with a recovery of a
handgun during a Terry stop.32 A lone officer patrolling a high-crime
area at 2:15 in the morning was told by an informant that a person
in a nearby car, later identified as Robert Williams, was in posses-
sion of a gun and narcotics.33 The officer, Sergeant Connolly, ap-
proached William’s car, tapped on the driver’s window, and asked
the driver to open the door.34 When Williams merely rolled down the
window, the officer reached inside the car and recovered a gun from
Williams’ waistband.35
The Adams Court found Sergeant Connolly’s conduct reasonable.
Justice Rehnquist concisely summarized the two extremes that had
previously faced the Court in Terry in formulating the “intermediate
response” of a Terry stop: “The Fourth Amendment does not require
a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for
probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape.”36 Instead, “A brief stop of a
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to main-
tain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information,
may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at
the time.”37 Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist, the very justice who
would later author Robinette’s majority opinion, recognized in Ad-
ams that a seizure would continue to exist while an officer
                                                                                                                   
 27. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 726-27.
31. 407 U.S. 143 (1971).
32. See id. at 144.
33. See id. at 144-45.
34. See id. at 145.
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 146.
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“maintained the status quo” during an investigatory detention.38
Thus, the Court recognized that once the officer initiated a seizure of
an individual, the “status quo” of the seizure remained in effect until
the officer indicated otherwise.39
The Court next considered United States v. Brignoni-Ponce.40
Here, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment applied to ran-
dom vehicle stops made by roving border patrols.41 Of particular in-
terest was an assumption made by the Brignoni-Ponce Court as it
calculated these stops’ “interference with [the motorist’s] individual
liberty.”42 In determining the intrusion to be “modest,” the Court ac-
cepted the government’s characterization of the vehicle stops as re-
quiring only that “the vehicle’s occupants [respond] to a brief ques-
tion or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a
right to be in the United States.”43 Here, Brignoni-Ponce assumed a
point apparently so obvious as to require no justification: once an of-
ficer initiated a seizure by pulling over a moving vehicle, the seizure
continued throughout the questioning process. As will be seen, an
entirely contrary assumption was made in Robinette.
In Delaware v. Prouse,44 a patrolman, lacking any kind of indi-
vidualized suspicion of illegal activity, stopped a car merely to check
the driver’s license and registration.45 Even though Prouse recog-
nized that the detention resulting from such a stop was typically
“quite brief,” Justice White, writing for the majority, expressed
alarm at the implications of such governmental intrusions.46 In es-
sence, the Court feared a gap in Fourth Amendment protection
against the exercise of government power, no matter how minimal.47
Lack of constitutional oversight of even a simple license-check stop
created an unacceptable danger: “This kind of standardless and un-
constrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in
previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the
field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.”48 Moreover, of par-
                                                                                                                   
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
41. Brignoni-Ponce reaffirmed the broad admonition in Terry that “[w]henever a po-
lice officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’
that person.” Id. at 878.
42. Id. at 879.
43. Id. at 880.
44. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
45. See id. at 650-51.
46. See id. at 653.
47. Justice White opined: “The marginal contribution to roadway safety possibly re-
sulting from a system of spot checks cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every ve-
hicle on the roads to a seizure—limited in magnitude compared to other intrusions but
nonetheless constitutionally cognizable—at the unbridled discretion of law enforcement
officials.” Id. at 661.
48. Id.
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ticular relevance to Robinette, the harm to the individual is no less
simply because he is stopped while driving a car:
Many people spend more hours each day traveling in an automo-
bile than walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater
sense of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than
they do in exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of
travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered governmental in-
trusion every time he entered an automobile, the security guaran-
teed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.49
In the next phase of precedent, the Court began a process of de-
veloping a specific test to define what government actions consti-
tuted a “seizure” for Fourth Amendment purposes. Here, the Court
focused on the dividing line between police behavior amounting to a
seizure, which is governed by the Fourth Amendment, and conduct
which falls short of a seizure and is beyond the constraints of the
reasonableness requirement. This analytical structure is important
because it focused judicial inquiry on the narrow stage of police-
citizen interaction to determine what police behavior transformed a
consensual encounter into a constitutional event. This, in turn, drew
the Court’s attention to what made a seizure begin rather than end.
The result is lopsided because the Court has identified facts that
trigger a seizure in a wealth of cases, yet at the same time, has re-
sponded with silence as to when the Fourth Amendment, once trig-
gered by a seizure, ultimately concludes.
In United States v. Mendenhall,50 Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) agents approached Sylvia Mendenhall as she walked
through an airport concourse.51 The two officials identified them-
selves as federal agents and asked to see Mendenhall’s identification
and airline ticket, which she provided.52 The agents asked why
Mendenhall’s airline ticket was in a name different from her own,
inquired as to her length of stay out of state, and then specifically
identified themselves as narcotics agents.53 Even though the agents
returned her ticket and driver’s license, they asked her to accompany
them to the airport DEA office some fifty feet away for further ques-
tioning.54 At the DEA office, an agent, after advising Mendenhall of
                                                                                                                   
49. Id. at 662-63. Justice White continued: “People are not shorn of all Fourth
Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor
are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks into their automo-
biles.” Id. The Court reiterated its concern regarding the potential abuse of attendant
“unfettered discretion” in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50-51 (1979).
50. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
51. See id. at 547.
52. See id. at 547-48.
53. See id. at 548.
54. See id.
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her right to refuse, asked for and obtained consent for a search of
Mendenhall’s person and bag.55
Justice Stewart, announcing the judgment of the Court in an
opinion joined only by Justice Rehnquist, found Terry to be of limited
help in determining whether the DEA agents had seized Mendenhall
before requesting consent. After all, in Terry, Detective McFadden
had “obviously” seized John Terry when “he took hold of him, spun
him around, and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.”56 In
contrast, Sylvia Mendenhall experienced no such physical contact
with the federal agents before consenting to be searched. Therefore
the DEA’s actions toward Mendenhall fell in a gap that existed in
the definition of a Fourth Amendment seizure. Justice Stewart
noted: “What was not determined in [Terry], however, was that a sei-
zure had taken place before the officer physically restrained Terry
for purposes of searching his person for weapons.”57 Justice Stewart
thus found a need to fill this constitutional void by drawing a divid-
ing line between a “seizure” on the one hand and a mere “encounter,”
which “intrude[d] upon no constitutionally protected interest,” on the
other.58
Thus, Justice Stewart established a bright line between persons
seized and those who were not. Individuals who were detained, even
briefly, enjoyed constitutional protection mandating “objective justi-
fication.”59 Meanwhile, people involved in police activity failing to
meet the seizure definition were not similarly protected. This was
because the police officer, like any other “citizen,” has the “liberty . . .
to address questions to other persons.”60 Likewise, the person the of-
ficer addresses “has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and
walk away.”61 Hence, “nothing in the Constitution” prevented such
encounters.62
It therefore became crucial to develop a clear test to determine
when police behavior crossed the line from consensual encounter into
Fourth Amendment seizure. Justice Stewart offered:
                                                                                                                   
55. See id.
56. Id. at 552.
57. Id. at 552-53.
58. Id. at 552.
59. Id. at 551.
60. Id. at 553.
61. Id.
62. Id. Justice Stewart premised his recognition of “consensual encounters” (the class
of police activity falling short of a “seizure”) on the assumption that individuals who re-
main and answer police questions despite their right to ignore such interrogations must
do so of their own volition. In this vein, Justice Stewart described the nonseizure encoun-
ter as when a person responds to the officer in some fashion not out of submission, but
“voluntarily in a spirit of apparent cooperation.” Id.
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We adhere to the view that a person is “seized” only when, by
means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of
movement is restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is
there any foundation whatever for invoking constitutional safe-
guards. . . . As long as the person to whom questions are put re-
mains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has
been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would
under the Constitution require some particularized and objective
justification.63
Weighing whether one felt restrained or able to walk away was to be
assessed by an objective standard: “We conclude that a person has
been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if,
in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a rea-
sonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.”64
This standard does not require that an individual make and fail at
an attempt to leave in order to establish a seizure. Obvious official
signals that may trigger a seizure included physical touching or the
display of weapons.65 Yet, more subtle actions could also trigger a
seizure, because the mere number of officers could establish a
“threatening presence,” and even the officer’s “use of language or
tone of voice” could indicate a seizure to a reasonable person in the
detainee’s circumstances.66
Justice Stewart’s standard had a dramatic result: the circum-
stances surrounding Mendenhall did not add up to a Fourth
Amendment seizure. The Court found it relevant that the agents
displayed neither uniforms nor weapons, approached Mendenhall
rather than summoned her to their presence, and requested rather
than demanded to see her identification and ticket.67 Justice Stewart
thus asserted that “[i]n short, nothing in the record suggests that the
respondent had any objective reason to believe that she was not free
to end the conversation in the concourse and proceed on her way,
                                                                                                                   
63. Id. at 553-54.
64. Id. at 554.
65. See id.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 555. Justice Stewart continued: “The respondent was not seized simply
by reason of the fact that the agents approached her, asked her if she would show them
her ticket and identification, and posed to her a few questions.” Id.
Of particular interest to the Court’s later analysis in Robinette, Justice Stewart in
Mendenhall contrasted an encounter with a pedestrian from that of a motorist:
[S]topping or diverting an automobile in transit, with the attendant opportu-
nity for a visual inspection of areas of the passenger compartment not other-
wise observable, is materially more intrusive than a question put to a passing
pedestrian, and the fact that the former amounts to a seizure tells very little
about the constitutional status of the latter.
Id. at 556-57.
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and for that reason we conclude that the agents’ initial approach to
her was not a seizure.”68
Justice Stewart’s emphasis on seizure-versus-nonseizure labeling
has created a laser-like focus by the Court on one boundary of a
Fourth Amendment seizure, its initiation.69 Florida v. Royer,70 an-
other case in which law enforcement approached a drug courier in an
airport, adopted Justice Stewart’s seizure-versus-consensual encoun-
ter analysis.71 The Royer Court echoed Mendenhall’s bright-line con-
clusion that consensual encounters, unlike even the briefest of sei-
zures, trigger no Fourth Amendment issue:
The person approached, however, need not answer any question
put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all
and may go on his way. He may not be detained even momentarily
without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal
to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those grounds.
If there is no detention—no seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment— then no constitutional rights have been in-
fringed.72
Two years later, the Court again referred to the “consensual encoun-
ter” in another drug courier case, Florida v. Rodriguez.73 By the time
Rodriguez was decided, the Court took it for granted that such con-
tacts with the citizenry implicate “no Fourth Amendment interest.”74
The Court’s emphasis on drawing a constitutional boundary line
between a “consensual encounter” and a Fourth Amendment
“seizure” continued as a consistent theme in its case law, even in
unique circumstances. In INS v. Delgado,75 the Court was confronted
with the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s (INS) practice of
                                                                                                                   
68. Id.
69. Although initially accepted by only one other member of the Court (Justice
Rehnquist), Justice Stewart’s formulation of a Fourth Amendment seizure in Mendenhall
was ultimately recognized by a majority of the Court. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
228 (1984). Justice Brennan noted: “A majority of the Court has since adopted [Justice
Stewart’s] formula as the appropriate standard for determining when inquiries made by
the police cross the boundary separating merely consensual encounters from forcible stops
to investigate a suspected crime.” Id. (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); see also
Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth Amend-
ment “Seizures”?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 736 (1991) (observing that “[a]lthough this tri-
furcation in Mendenhall seemed to deprive the case of any significance, the Stewart stan-
dard later came to command a majority of the Court”). Indeed, Justice Stewart’s “test” ul-
timately was “embraced” by a unanimous Court. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 573 (1988).
70. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
71. See id.
72. Id. at 497-98.
73. 469 U.S. 1 (1984).
74. Id. at 6.
75. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
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“factory surveys.”76 Instead of officials stopping people as they were
in motion, whether by driving down a street or walking through an
airport concourse, the INS agents in Delgado came upon individuals
who were at work, and thus already at their destinations. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, described the INS’s factory surveys
as follows:
At the beginning of the surveys several agents positioned them-
selves near the buildings’ exits, while other agents dispersed
throughout the factory to question most, but not all, employees at
their work stations. The agents displayed badges, carried walkie-
talkies, and were armed, although at no point during any of the
surveys was a weapon ever drawn. Moving systematically through
the factory, the agents approached employees and, after identify-
ing themselves, asked them from one to three questions relating to
their citizenship. If the employee gave a credible reply that he was
a United States citizen, the questioning ended, and the agent
moved on to another employee. If the employee gave an unsatisfac-
tory response or admitted that he was an alien, the employee was
asked to produce his immigration papers. During the survey, em-
ployees continued with their work and were free to walk around
within the factory.77
In determining whether such conduct amounted to a seizure, Del-
gado again referred to the Court’s delineation between a “consensual
encounter” and a “seizure.”78 Indeed, the Court even recognized that
an initially consensual exchange could be transformed into a Fourth
Amendment detention if the surrounding circumstances so indicated
to a reasonable person.79 Yet, the Court viewed the agents’ actions in
performing the factory survey as nothing more than setting up a
situation where officers could perform “mere questioning of an indi-
vidual.”80 Justice Rehnquist then deemed that “police questioning, by
itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment violation.”81 As to
the typical reaction a person may have to mere questioning, Justice
Rehnquist noted, “While most citizens will respond to a police re-
quest, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they
                                                                                                                   
76. Id. at 212.
77. Id. at 212. Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, labeled the Court’s description
as “an unrealistic view of the facts.” See id. at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissent-
ing).
78. Id. at 215.
79. See id. Thus, the Delgado majority considered whether the circumstances before
it would initiate a Fourth Amendment seizure, but, as the issue was not before it, the
Court did not have the occasion to consider which facts could end the seizure, thus return-
ing it to a consensual encounter. See id.
80. Id. at 216.
81. Id.
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are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of
the response.”82
Delgado therefore established a particular mode of analysis for
seizure issues. Although the Court had directed judges to view “all
the circumstances surrounding the incident” to decide whether a
“reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave,”83 it did not envision actually considering all the facts as taken
together. The facts were not to be viewed in their totality, as impact-
ing on and building upon each other. Rather, each fact was a discrete
bit of information, viewed in a vacuum.84
This piecemeal approach was highlighted by the Delgado Court’s
response to concerns raised by the court of appeals, which was both-
ered by the INS’s use of the “element of surprise” and “systematic
questioning of individual workers by several INS agents.”85 Rather
than being considered on the merits, these facts were dismissed as
not being “pivotal” to the lower court’s decision.86 This analysis en-
abled Justice Rehnquist to isolate as the “pivotal factor” in the lower
court’s decision the “stationing of INS agents near the exits of the
factory buildings.”87 Having thus discounted the court of appeals’
several concerns into one factor regarding the posting of agents at
the doors, Delgado was free to diminish the impact of this one vari-
able:
Ordinarily, when people are at work their freedom to move about
has been meaningfully restricted, not by the actions of law en-
forcement officials, but by the workers’ voluntary obligations to
their employers. The record indicates that when these surveys
were initiated, the employees were about their ordinary business,
operating machinery and performing other job assignments. . . .
[T]he record also indicates that workers were not prevented by the
agents from moving about the factories.88
                                                                                                                   
82. Id.
83. Id. at 215 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
84. In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan stated:
The Court goes astray, in my view, chiefly because it insists upon considering
each interrogation in isolation as if respondents had been questioned by the
INS in a setting similar to an encounter between a single police officer and a
lone passerby that might occur on a street corner. Obviously, once the Court
begins with such an unrealistic view of the facts, it is only a short step to the
equally fanciful conclusion that respondents acted voluntarily when they
stopped and answered the agents’ questions. . . . The surrounding circum-
stances in this case are far different from an isolated encounter between the
police and a passerby on the street.
Id. at 229 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
85. Id. at 217.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 218.
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When considering respondent’s contention that the very station-
ing of agents near the exits showed the INS’s intent to prevent peo-
ple from leaving, the Court treated such stationing of officials as an
event separate from the questioning of individuals inside the factory:
“If mere questioning does not constitute a seizure when it occurs in-
side the factory, it is no more a seizure when it occurs at the exits.”89
Such a one-bite-at-a-time approach allowed Delgado to ingest all the
facts into its analysis without considering the effect of the entire
meal. Through such semantic “sleight of hand,” Justice Rehnquist
deemed the “widespread disturbance” caused by “15 to 20” agents
moving “systematically through the rows of workers,” resulting in
some employees being handcuffed and led away to awaiting vans, as
“nothing more” than reasonable questioning of employees.90
The Court performed similar surgery on the facts of Michigan v.
Chesternut.91 One afternoon, four officers patrolling the streets of De-
troit saw Michael Mose Chesternut look at their marked police
cruiser and run.92 In order to “see where [Chesternut] was going,” the
cruiser quickly caught up with and drove alongside him as he ran.93
Police saw him discard several packets he had retrieved from his
pocket.94 One of the cruiser’s passengers, Officer Peltier, got out of
the car and recovered the packets, determining them to be codeine
pills.95 Chesternut was then arrested.96 He moved to dismiss the
charges on the ground that he had been “seized” in violation of the
Fourth Amendment at the time he discarded the pills.97
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun characterized
the ruling in Chesternut as a middle course between two extremes.98
The government had argued that “the Fourth Amendment is never
implicated until an individual stops in response to the police’s show
of authority.”99 Meanwhile, Chesternut contended that “any and all
                                                                                                                   
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also id. at 226, 229-30 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
91. 486 U.S. 567 (1987).





97. See id. at 570.
98. In this sense, the Chesternut Court adopted an approach favoring an
“intermediate response,” much as it did in Terry. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17-19
(1968); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972).
99. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572. Justice Blackmun continued: “Thus, petitioner would
have us rule that a lack of objective and particularized suspicion would not poison police
conduct, no matter how coercive, as long as the police did not succeed in actually appre-
hending the individual.” Id.
This logical extreme became the standard rule only four years later in California v. Ho-
dari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), wherein Justice Scalia defined a Fourth Amendment seizure,
1998]           FOURTH AMENDMENT AND MOTORISTS 533
police ‘chases’ are Fourth Amendment seizures.”100 Justice Blackmun
bluntly rejected both as attempts to create “bright-line” rules for “all
investigatory pursuits” and thus as failures to heed the Court’s
“clear direction” favoring a “contextual approach” where “‘all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident’” were weighed in each case.101
Justice Blackmun announced that the Court had “embraced”
Justice Stewart’s Mendenhall test for defining a Fourth Amendment
seizure: “The test provides that the police can be said to have seized
an individual ‘only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was
not free to leave.’”102 Justice Blackmun essentially found Justice
Stewart’s test to be the best of both worlds, for it was “flexible
enough to be applied to the whole range of police conduct in an
equally broad range of settings” while at the same time it called for
“consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regard-
less of the particular individual’s response to the actions of the po-
lice.”103 Because the Mendenhall objective “reasonable person” stan-
dard did not vary with the particular individual approached, it
therefore freed police to decide in advance which actions would trig-
ger Fourth Amendment application.104
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun celebrated the Mendenhall test’s
“necessary” imprecision, for it was “designed to assess the coercive
effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on par-
ticular details of that conduct in isolation.”105 Such language belies
the Court’s selective memory, as its piecemeal analysis of the facts in
Delgado occurred only four years earlier. Further, Justice Black-
mun’s admonition to view the situation “as a whole,” including not
only a perusal of “police conduct” but also “the setting in which the
conduct occurs,” was not heeded even in Chesternut.106 Rather than
considering all the circumstances surrounding the incident, the
Chesternut Court ultimately labeled the entire episode as merely “a
brief acceleration to catch up with respondent, followed by a short
drive alongside him.”107 The Court spent little time considering the
setting of the event, the number of officers, or the effect of the mark-
                                                                                                                   
based on the common law of arrest, as requiring “either physical force . . . or, where that is
absent, submission to the assertion of authority.” Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
100. Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 572.
101. Id. at 572-73.
102. Id. at 573 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
103. Id. at 574.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 576.
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ings on the car and uniforms on the officers.108 Such facts form a
portion of “all of the circumstances surrounding the incident”109 and
should therefore have been weighed. Indeed, such particulars were
not seen as insignificant by the Mendenhall Court, the opinion from
which Justice Blackmun adopted the Court’s “test.”110 Instead,
Chesternut emphasized absent circumstances, such as the fact that
police failed to activate their siren or display their weapons.111
Therefore, despite the fact that a marked cruiser filled to capacity
with uniformed officers sped up to follow Chesternut around a corner
and then drove alongside him, the Court concluded that a reasonable
person in Chesternut’s position would not have believed “that he was
not free to disregard the police presence and go about his busi-
ness.”112
The Court changed track in its next case, California v. Hodari
D.113 In Hodari, police officers Brian McColgin and Jerry Pertoso,
while patrolling the streets of Oakland, observed several youths
scatter, apparently in panic, upon seeing the officers’ vehicle.114 The
officers gave chase, McColgin by car and Pertoso on foot.115 Hodari
was one of the youths who took flight.116 “Looking behind as he ran,
he did not turn and see Pertoso until the officer was almost upon
him, whereupon he tossed away what appeared to be a small rock. A
moment later, Pertoso tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and radioed
for assistance.”117 Hodari ultimately moved to suppress the small
rock, later determined to be crack cocaine, arguing that it was recov-
ered as a result of an unlawful seizure of his person.118
To arrive at an answer to the question of whether Hodari was
seized at the time he threw the crack cocaine, Justice Scalia took a
road different from that taken by the Court in all its cases since
                                                                                                                   
108. See id. at 569 (stating that the four policemen “followed the respondent around
the corner” and thus did not merely drive up alongside him while patrolling).
109. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
110. As to the number of officers, Justice Stewart found as a relevant factor “the
threatening presence of several officers.” Id. Moreover, Justice Stewart deemed important
the fact that the agents who approached Mendenhall “wore no uniforms.” Id. at 555.
111. “The record does not reflect that the police activated a siren or flashers; or that
they commanded respondent to halt, or displayed any weapons; or that they operated
the[ir] car in an aggressive manner to block respondent’s course or otherwise control the
direction or speed of his movement.” Chesternut, 486 U.S. at 575. A demonstration of the
continued parsing of facts is provided in the next sentence: “While the very presence of a
police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating, this
kind of police presence does not, standing alone, constitute a seizure.” Id. (emphasis
added).
112. Id. at 576.
113. 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
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Terry.119 Instead of relying on the precedent as it had evolved since
1967, the year the Warren Court handed down Terry, Justice Scalia
peeled the onion all the way back to the common law. He commenced
with the most basic of premises, considering the meaning of seizure
in relation to any object, whether “animate or inanimate.”120 He
noted that the common law generally understood seizures to include
not merely grasping the object, but “actually bringing it within
physical control.”121 Thus, confining himself to the law in force at es-
sentially the time of the framers,122 Justice Scalia relied on the defi-
nition of the only seizure then recognized for the person, arrest: “To
constitute an arrest, however—the quintessential “seizure of the
person” under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—the mere
grasping or application of physical force with lawful authority,
whether or not it succeeded in subduing the arrestee, was suffi-
cient.”123
Justice Scalia then signaled that it was the arrest, the most se-
vere form of seizure of the person, that would become the yardstick
for the Fourth Amendment seizure: “We do not think it desirable,
even as a policy matter, to stretch the Fourth Amendment beyond its
words and beyond the meaning of arrest.”124
Of course, an arrest is the most intrusive form of seizure of the
person, and therefore it is the most narrowly defined kind of deten-
tion. Justice Scalia thus chose the most restrictive form of seizure to
determine the boundaries of seizures of the person in general. Per-
haps Justice Scalia’s reliance on the law of arrest was forced upon
him by his mode of analysis, for he anchored his reasoning to con-
cepts formed during the common law near the time of ratification,
and therefore could not consult Terry, a decision handed down over a
century later. Yet the confines of Justice Scalia’s analysis are mani-
fest; by defining Fourth Amendment seizure in terms of arrest, he
failed to consider the potentially broader dimensions of Terry stops,
and so artificially curtails Fourth Amendment protection.125
                                                                                                                   
119. Justice Scalia framed the question thusly: “As this case comes to us, the only is-
sue presented is whether, at the time he dropped the drugs, Hodari had been ‘seized’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 623.
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id.
122. See id. (citing The Josefa Segunda, 10 Wheat. 312, 325-26 (1825)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 627.
125. Justice Scalia’s failure to consider Terry might have been no accident. He had
previously criticized Terry for failing to consider the state of the law at the time of ratifi-
cation:
I take it to be a fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication that the
terms in the Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the
time of their ratification. Thus, when the Fourth Amendment provides that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
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As to when the Fourth Amendment is triggered, Justice Scalia of-
fered a new, bright-line definition, based on the law of arrest: “An
arrest (and therefore Fourth Amendment application) requires either
physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission to the asser-
tion of authority.”126 This test emphasizes the behavior of the indi-
vidual pursued by police. A seizure “does not remotely apply” to an
officer yelling “‘Stop, in the name of the law!’ at a fleeing form that
continues to flee. That is no seizure.”127
Hodari, therefore, prescribed as a necessary ingredient of a
Fourth Amendment seizure of a person by show of authority the per-
son’s own conduct. In a sense, the individual can, by his or her own
actions, initiate the Fourth Amendment in certain circumstances.
Should an individual be confronted with a government official’s as-
sertion of authority, the citizen can summon constitutional protec-
tion by submitting to that authority. A submission to an officer’s
authority thus simultaneously forces the officer to submit to the
Fourth Amendment.
Justice Scalia’s analysis represented a dramatic shift away from
the Court’s modern precedent. Perhaps in recognition of the incon-
                                                                                                                   
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated”
(emphasis added), it “is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an un-
reasonable search and seizure when it was adopted,” . . . . The decision of ours
that gave approval to such searches, Terry v. Ohio . . . made no serious at-
tempt to determine compliance with traditional standards, but rather, accord-
ing to the style of this Court at the time, simply adjudged that such a search
was “reasonable” by current estimations.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379-80 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). Stepping outside of the analysis followed by the Terry line of precedent, the
Hodari Court reconsidered the boundaries of a seizure somewhat independent of that case
law. Included within this discussion was not only an analysis of the starting point of a sei-
zure, but also mention of its end point. Justice Scalia noted:
To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force,
despite the arrestee’s escape, is not to say that for Fourth Amendment pur-
poses there is a continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity. If, for exam-
ple, Pertoso had laid his hands upon Hodari to arrest him, but Hodari had
broken away and had then cast away the cocaine, it would hardly be realistic
to say that that disclosure had been made during the course of an arrest. “A
seizure is a single act, and not a continuous fact.”
Hodari, 499 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Beyond this dictum, no rule
is established to identify the end point of all seizures.
126. Id. at 626 (parenthetical and emphasis added). Although Justice Scalia’s analysis
of the common law at the time of ratification represented a departure in method from
Terry and its progeny, the words ultimately used in the Hodari test would not have
sounded entirely alien to the justices on the bench at the time of Terry or Mendenhall. In
a footnote Chief Justice Warren mentioned in reference to seizures of the person: “Only
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way re-
strained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968). Justice Stewart cited this language in his opinion in
Mendenhall. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 544, 552 (1980). However, nei-
ther reference included the citizen’s own actions as part of the seizure definition.
127. Hodari, 499 U.S. at 626.
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gruity of Hodari among the case law, Justice Scalia responded by at-
tempting to diminish and even marginalize the Court’s previous
rulings. Justice Scalia referred to Justice Stewart’s standard for sei-
zure of a person as “the so-called Mendenhall test,”128 even though he
conceded that this definition was “adopted by the Court in later
cases.”129 Further, he seemed to indicate that the “whether a reason-
able person feels free to leave” analysis was not alone determinative
of the existence of a seizure in any case:
In seeking to rely upon [the Mendenhall] test here, respondent
fails to read it carefully. It says that a person has been seized “only
if,” not that he has been seized “whenever”; it states a necessary,
but not a sufficient, condition for seizure—or, more precisely, for
seizure effected through a “show of authority.”130
Thus, Hodari, in one sentence and despite the Court’s reliance upon
it for two decades, reduced Mendenhall from a test to a mere factor,
albeit a “necessary” one. When faced with the Court’s heavy reliance
upon the Mendenhall standard in Chesternut, Justice Scalia ex-
plained all that spilled ink by asserting that the officers’ actions in
driving along Chesternut never rose to the level of conveying “the
message that he was not free to disregard the police and go about his
business.”131 Thus, the Court never reached the issue of whether, had
that message indeed been sent, a Fourth Amendment seizure would
have occurred.132
After the detour taken in Hodari, the Court, still in its 1991 term,
returned to its well-worn line of precedent that originated with
Terry, in Florida v. Bostick.133 In Bostick, the Broward County Sher-
iff’s Department had developed a drug interdiction program wherein
officers routinely boarded buses at scheduled stops and requested
passengers’ permission to search their luggage.134 Implementing this
policy, two officers, “‘complete with badges, insignia and one of them
holding a recognizable zipper pouch, containing a pistol,’” ap-
proached Terrance Bostick as he sat on a bus bound from Miami to
Atlanta in a stopover in Fort Lauderdale.135 The officers asked Bos-
tick for his bus ticket and identification, and returned these items
when they found them “unremarkable.”136 However, the police re-
                                                                                                                   
128. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
129. Id. Justice Scalia’s implied criticism of the “so-called” Mendenhall test is curious,
for he joined Chesternut, the unanimous decision that he himself acknowledged adopted
this as the standard of a Fourth Amendment seizure of a person.
130. Id. at 628.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
134. See id. at 431.
135. Id. (quoting Bostick v. State, 554 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. 1989)).
136. Id.
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mained with Bostick, advising him they were narcotics agents look-
ing for drugs.137 The officers then requested permission to search
Bostick’s luggage, advising him that he had the right to refuse con-
sent.138 The trial court found that Bostick consented, and the subse-
quent search recovered cocaine, resulting in Bostick’s arrest.139 Jus-
tice O’Connor, writing for the Court, found two facts to be
“particularly worth noting”:
First, the police specifically advised Bostick that he had the right
to refuse consent. Second, at no time did the officers threaten Bos-
tick with a gun. The Florida Supreme Court indicated that one of-
ficer carried a zipper pouch containing a pistol—the equivalent of
carrying a gun in a holster—but the court did not suggest that the
gun was ever removed from its pouch, pointed at Bostick, or oth-
erwise used in a threatening manner.140
In Bostick, unlike Hodari, Justice O’Connor clearly returned the
Court to the totality of the circumstances analysis it had developed
since Terry in 1968. In fact, the Bostick Court cited Terry in building
on its basic premise that not all intercourse between officer and citi-
zen amounts to a seizure.141 However, perhaps in deference to Ho-
dari, which the Court handed down months before Bostick, reliance
on Mendenhall was muted and even somewhat camouflaged. Justice
O’Connor did indeed cite Mendenhall for the proposition that officers
may request identification even when they lack a basis for suspect-
ing the individual accosted.142 However, Bostick avoided outright
mention of Mendenhall when referring to previous discussion of
“encounters in airports” by citing Rodriguez, which itself relied on
Mendenhall.143
By being the last case in which the Court explicitly ruled on the
boundaries of a Fourth Amendment seizure of the person, Bostick
appropriately represented the culmination of several rationales the
Court had developed since Terry. In fact, certain concepts, which
were mere nebulous notions in Terry, had, with Bostick, solidified
into established precedent. The most dramatic example of this phe-
                                                                                                                   
137. See id. at 431-32.
138. See id. at 432.
139. See id.
140. Id. Justice O’Connor considered these two facts so crucial that she repeated them
later in the opinion: “Here, the facts recited by the Florida Supreme Court indicate that
the officers did not point guns at Bostick or otherwise threaten him and that they specifi-
cally advised Bostick that he could refuse consent.” Id. at 437.
141. See id. at 434.
142. See id. at 435.
143. Id. at 434 (“The Court has dealt with similar encounters in airports and has
found them to be ‘the sort of consensual encounter[s] that implicat[e] no Fourth Amend-
ment interest.’”) (quoting Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984)). This statement was
in turn taken by the Rodriguez Court from Mendenhall. See Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5-6
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
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nomenon was the Court’s articulation of the “mere questioning” rule.
In Terry, the Court determined that it lacked sufficient information
from the record to entertain the issue of whether Officer McFadden’s
behavior before his physical touching of Terry amounted to a Fourth
Amendment seizure.144 In contrast to such hesitation, Bostick ac-
cepted as a given that “[s]ince Terry, we have held repeatedly that
mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure.”145 Thus, in
thirty years, the Court firmly established that officers have an af-
firmative right to approach citizens and engage them in conversa-
tion. Such action may include not only questioning, but also request-
ing identification.146 Further, officers may commit these intrusions
even when they have absolutely “no basis for suspecting a particular
individual,” for the Fourth Amendment simply does not apply.147
This “mere question” rule stems from yet another maxim originat-
ing with Terry and polished by Bostick: An officer, like any other
human, may interact with other people. As long as a reasonable per-
son feels free “to ignore the police presence and go about his busi-
ness,” the encounter is consensual, and no Fourth Amendment inter-
ests are implicated.148 Therefore, the key inquiry is whether officers
have transformed a consensual encounter into a seizure by convey-
ing a “message that compliance with their requests is required.”149
The focus traditionally had been on whether official conduct had re-
strained an individual from “walk[ing] away.”150 Justice O’Connor
refined this rule due to the analytical problems presented by the bus
traveler:
[W]hen the person is seated on a bus and has no desire to leave,
the degree to which a reasonable person would feel that he or she
could leave is not an accurate measure of the coercive effect of the
encounter.
Here, for example, the mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to
leave the bus does not mean that the police seized him. Bostick
was a passenger on a bus that was scheduled to depart. He would
not have felt free to leave the bus even if the police had not been
present. Bostick’s movements were “confined” in a sense, but this
was the natural result of his decision to take the bus; it says
                                                                                                                   
144. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
145. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. Justice O’Connor felt so comfortable with this truism of
constitutional law that she repeated its substance twice within two paragraphs. The
Court’s other statement of this rule is as follows: “Our cases make it clear that a seizure
does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few
questions.” Id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 435.
148. Id. at 437.
149. Id.
150. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
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nothing about whether or not the police conduct at issue was coer-
cive.151
Therefore, the inquiry in such situations should instead focus on
“whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”152 This question is
still answered by “taking into account all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the encounter.”153
However, in actually applying this “all of the circumstances”
analysis, Bostick continued the Court’s bad habit of fracturing the
totality of the circumstances into a series of separate parts. Justice
O’Connor failed to follow her own advice in looking at the situation
as a whole from the vantagepoint of a person seated on a bus. In-
stead, she first took Terrance Bostick out of his bus seat:
There is no doubt that if this same encounter had taken place be-
fore Bostick boarded the bus or in the lobby of the bus terminal, it
would not rise to the level of a seizure. The Court has dealt with
similar encounters in airports and has found them to be “the sort
of consensual encounter[s] that implicat[e] no Fourth Amendment
interest.”154
After establishing that the conduct of Bostick’s two officers, had it
taken place in the kind of ideal vacuum found in an airport terminal
or lobby, would not have even implicated the Fourth Amendment,
the Court then separately considered the fact that this case actually
occurred “in the cramped confines of a bus.”155 Thus, the total impact
of having official attention directed toward the individual while
trapped in a seat was diffused by taking all the facts and parceling
them out in pieces.
As noted by Bostick’s bus traveler refinement of the reasonable
person test, officials need not account for restrictions on individual
freedom caused by circumstances beyond government conduct. The
fact that a person seated on a bus does not feel free to leave has no
place in the measure of the coercive effect of government conduct.156
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Just like the workers in Delgado, the bus traveler voluntarily limits
his own freedom regardless of the actions of law enforcement.157 This
limit on personal freedom is in a sense the fault of the individual,
and therefore will not be charged to the police. The Court will look at
all of the circumstances that could cause a reasonable person to feel
compelled to respond to the police, except for those which are of the
individual’s own making. If the Court truly carried out this logic,
Bostick, who placed himself on the bus, would, for purposes of apply-
ing the totality of the circumstances test, be removed from the bus
and again taken out to the terminal.
The final theme fully formed in Bostick involved the threshold of
intimidation needed to trigger a seizure. The Court previously indi-
cated, in Chesternut, that police could exude some intimidation and
still not trigger Fourth Amendment application. The Court conceded
that the “very presence of a police car driving parallel to a running
pedestrian could be somewhat intimidating.”158 It was not, however,
intimidating enough “standing alone,” to constitute a seizure.159
Likewise, in Bostick, one officer was indeed armed with a gun. How-
ever, Justice O’Connor found it “particularly worth noting” that no
evidence suggested that “the gun was ever removed from its pouch,
pointed at Bostick, or otherwise used in a threatening manner.”160
The force of this reasoning set up a particularly high threshold for
the intimidation necessary to trigger a seizure. The Court found the
absence of severe police behavior, such as the drawing of guns or the
making of threats, to be relevant. The implication must be that
lesser actions might not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.
Further, the viewing of all the facts to the situation now includes
facts that did not occur at the scene. The lack of certain official be-
havior now acts to mitigate official conduct to such a degree that it
may prevent the application of the Constitution.
One issue missing from Bostick was a question essentially missed
by all of the cases since Terry: How is a continuing seizure of a per-
son assessed? All of the Court’s precedent involved measuring the
onset of constitutional application in the vacuum of an initial en-
counter. None considered the question of determining a seizure, un-
der the totality of the circumstances test, when one of the circum-
stances was a previous seizure. Of course, the Court properly re-
frained from promulgating a rule on this issue because the facts nec-
essary to determine such a case were never before it. Yet, this
changed with Robinette, for here the Court was indeed confronted
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with the situation where a citizen’s consent was requested during
the limbo existing after a seizure affected by a traffic stop. The Ohio
State Supreme Court recognized that Robinette had been seized and
considered it crucial to decide whether he remained seized during the
request for permission to search.161 The Court was thus presented
with not only an opportunity but a call to duty to clarify this portion
of the seizure definition.
B.   The Court’s Allusion to an End Point for Seizures in Its
Definition of the Brevity Requirement for Investigatory Detentions
A Fourth Amendment seizure of a person is, of course, finite, for it
must, at some time, end. Although the Court has never squarely ad-
dressed the question of defining the end point of a seizure of the per-
son, the Court has provided some clues. In United States v.
Sharpe,162 the Court made various assumptions about a seizure’s
conclusion when it considered the “brevity” requirement of investi-
gative stops.163 In Sharpe, DEA Agent Cooke became suspicious
when he observed an apparently heavily loaded pickup truck with a
camper shell and a Pontiac driving in tandem across state lines.164
Agent Cooke radioed the State Highway Patrol to make an investi-
gative stop of both vehicles.165 Responding to Agent Cooke’s call, Offi-
cer Thrasher activated his flashing light and motioned the Pontiac
driver to stop.166 As Sharpe, the driver of the Pontiac, began to com-
ply, Savage, the pickup’s driver, cut between the Pontiac and the pa-
trol car, almost causing a collision.167 Officer Thrasher pursued the
pickup, pulling it over about one-half of a mile down the road from
where Agent Cooke stopped with the Pontiac.168 Agent Cooke waited
for the Myrtle Beach Police to arrive and detain Sharpe before he
joined Officer Thrasher with the pickup.169 This caused Savage to be
detained, against his express desire to leave, for fifteen minutes be-
fore Agent Cooke could arrive to investigate the pickup.170 Agent
Cooke made some further observations of the pickup’s exterior,
opened the rear of the camper, found marijuana, and arrested Sav-
age and ultimately Sharpe as well.171
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The Sharpe Court was thus presented with the issue of whether,
under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officer and the
agent to detain Savage for twenty minutes in light of the Fourth
Amendment’s standards of reasonableness.172 Of course, the whole
concept of brevity is based on an assumption that the time period
measured has not only a beginning, but also an identifiable ending.
Sharpe indicated that a seizure’s end point is linked to the reason for
the intrusion in the first place: “[A]n investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the pur-
pose of the stop.”173 Brevity was more than counting the ticks of a
clock; it included a consideration of the “law enforcement purposes to
be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effec-
tuate those purposes.”174 As to Agent Cooke’s actions, the Court em-
phasized that the lower court did not conclude that he “unnecessarily
prolonged Savage’s detention.”175 The implication here is patent; if
Agent Cooke had detained Savage for any time beyond that neces-
sary to serve the law enforcement purposes of the stop, he would
have unnecessarily prolonged the motorist’s detention, and thus vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment’s brevity requirement. Later in the
opinion, the Sharpe Court again restricted the scope of a legal de-
tention to the “time . . . necessary to detain” the person.176 Therefore,
Sharpe unquestioningly applied a “completion of purpose” definition
to determine the end point of a reasonable seizure of the person.177
Law enforcement may hold a person only so long as necessary to
complete the lawful purpose of a stop.178
The Court brought home the importance of the completion-of-
purpose definition of seizure in its application of Sharpe’s facts. The
Court found: “During most of Savage’s 20-minute detention, Cooke
was attempting to contact Thrasher and enlisting the help of the lo-
cal police who remained with Sharpe while Cooke left to pursue Offi-
cer Thrasher and the pickup.”179 Since Agent Cooke did everything
he reasonably could to carry out the investigation diligently, his stop
did “not involve any delay unnecessary to the legitimate investiga-
tion.”180
Interestingly, Sharpe followed the “completion of purpose” test for
the end of a seizure while at the same time rejecting the call to for-
mulate a “bright-line” rule for measuring brevity of investigatory de-
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tentions.181 The Court felt that a “hard-and-fast time limit” on de-
tentions would hamper police in diligently pursuing the purpose of
the stop.182 Thus, the Court apparently envisioned the completion-of-
purpose definition as a standard sufficiently flexible for daily police
use, in contrast to the bright-line time limit it rejected.
C.   The Court’s Creation of “Bright-Line” Fourth Amendment Rules
In assessing the reasonableness of Deputy Newsome’s actions to-
ward Robinette, the Robinette Court asserted that it “consistently es-
chewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific na-
ture of the reasonableness inquiry.”183 Chief Justice Rehnquist then
bolstered this point by citing the Court’s avoidance of bright-line
rules for the determination of seizures during law enforcement ap-
proaches at airport terminals, police investigatory pursuits, and
drug agent bus sweeps.184 The Court even noted its rejection of a per
se rule when weighing the voluntariness of consent to search.185 Rob-
inette’s reliance on precedent, however, was selective. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his uninterrupted list of cases adhering to the totality
of the circumstances approach, failed to acknowledge prior Supreme
Court holdings that clearly established bright-line rules. Such omis-
sions are all the more curious, for they required that the Court turn
a blind eye to factual settings much more similar to the one Robi-
nette faced than airports or bus sweeps. Indeed, the bright-line rules
missed by the Court were designed in the context of traffic stops of
motorists.
The first bright-line case, Pennsylvania v. Mimms,186 was indeed
mentioned by the Robinette Court.187 In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist
cited it as authority to justify Deputy Newsome’s request that Robi-
nette exit his car.188 In Mimms, Philadelphia officers lawfully
stopped Harry Mimms for driving with expired license tags in viola-
tion of the state Motor Vehicle Code.189 One of the officers then asked
Mimms to step out of his car and produce his license and owner’s
card.190 When Mimms did so, officers observed a bulge under his
sports jacket.191 A resulting frisk revealed a revolver.192 Rather than
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consider only the facts of this particular case, the Mimms Court
weighed the interests of the state versus those of the individual in
such cases in general.193 The result was the creation of a bright-line
rule for all lawfully initiated traffic stops: “We hold . . . that once a
motor vehicle has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the
police officers may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without
violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures.”194 This was the holding Chief Justice
Rehnquist cited in Robinette to support Deputy Newsome’s actions.195
However, in the very next paragraph of the Robinette opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist failed to recognize this bright-line standard in his
rendition of the Court’s rejection of per se rules.196
Another case that belies the Court’s consistent shunning of bright
lines is Hodari. As previously noted in Part II.A. of this Article, the
Hodari Court broke away from what it described as the “so-called
Mendenhall test,” which considered the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the police and the citizen.197 Instead, Justice Scalia
crafted a specific definition for seizure of the person that pinpointed
only certain factors to weigh in determining the exact genesis of any
seizure: “An arrest (and therefore Fourth Amendment application)
requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent, submission
to the assertion of authority.”198 This, quite simply, is nothing less
than a bright-line test for seizure of the person. The Court itself has
flatly stated as much. In Chesternut, the government advanced the
argument that “the Fourth Amendment is never implicated until an
individual stops in response to the police’s show of authority.”199
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Blackmun criticized this ap-
proach as a “bright-line rule” which failed to “heed this Court’s clear
direction that any assessment as to whether police conduct amounts
to a seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment must take into ac-
count ‘all of the circumstances surrounding the incident.’”200 Thus, in
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the space of four years, the Court went from unanimously condemn-
ing a per se rule to adopting it.201 This inconsistency was then com-
pounded by the Court’s reassertion of the totality of the circum-
stances approach in Bostick, a case handed down only months after
Hodari.202 Such a history hardly supports Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
portrayal of a Court “consistently eschew[ing] bright-line rules.”203
Indeed, rather than resembling a train steadily chugging down a
straight track, the Court appears to be a rather erratic pendulum,
shifting with each case. In the same term it handed down Robinette,
the Court also decided Maryland v. Wilson.204 Here, months after
stating in Robinette that the Court “consistently eschewed” bright-
line rules, it not only reasserted but expanded Mimms’ per se hold-
ing allowing officers to ask lawfully stopped drivers to exit their ve-
hicles.205 As to the apparent inconsistency of its rulings, Chief Justice
Rehnquist offered:
Respondent argues that, because we have generally eschewed
bright-line rules in the Fourth Amendment context, see, e.g., Ohio
v. Robinette . . . we should not here conclude that passengers may
constitutionally be ordered out of lawfully stopped vehicles. But,
that we typically avoid per se rules concerning searches and sei-
zures does not mean that we have always done so; Mimms itself
drew a bright line, and we believe the principles that underlay that
decision apply to passengers as well.206
Thus, in one term, the same Court, in two opinions authored by
the same Justice, took diametrically opposed approaches toward the
appropriateness of the use of bright lines in Fourth Amendment liti-
gation.207 Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to see the enormity
of the Court’s latest shift in Wilson, for rather than remembering the
Court’s “consistent eschew[ing]” of bright-line rules, he downgraded
the Court’s avoidance of this approach with the terms “generally”
and “typically.”208
The tug-of-war in which the Court has placed itself results from
the competing concerns it faces in seizure-of-the-person cases. The
Court has, at times, avoided an absolute rule so that it might craft
guidelines to handle all of the various police-versus-citizen encoun-
ters, which it has found “incredibly rich in diversity.”209 However, the
                                                                                                                   
201. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200.
202. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435-37 (1991).
203. Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996).
204. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
205. The Wilson Court concluded: “We therefore hold that an officer making a traffic
stop may order passengers to get out of the car pending completion of the stop.” Id. at 886.
206. Id. at 885 n.1 (citation omitted).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 193-206.
208. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 885.
209. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968).
1998]           FOURTH AMENDMENT AND MOTORISTS 547
Court has also recognized powerful rationales that support bright-
line guides for law enforcement.210 In New York v. Belton,211 a case
wherein the Court sought a clear rule establishing the scope of
searches incident to arrest in automobiles, Justice Stewart noted
that the Fourth Amendment:
“can only be realized if the police are acting under a set of rules
which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct de-
termination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is
justified in the interest of law enforcement.” . . . This is because
“Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . is primarily intended to regulate
the police in their day-to-day activities and thus ought to be ex-
pressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the
context of the law enforcement activities in which they are neces-
sarily engaged . . . .”212
Thus, in language strikingly contrary to the thrust of totality of
the circumstances reasoning, Belton continued, “‘[A] single familiar
standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited
time and expertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual
interests involved in the specific circumstances they confront.’”213
Therefore, bright lines can advance personal privacy and security by
ensuring that police easily know the limits of their day-to-day ac-
tivities.214 This strong language, along with a sampling of Fourth
Amendment cases, calls into serious question Robinette’s wholesale
rejection of per se rules.
III.   ROBINETTE’S CONFUSION OF THE SCOPE OF SEIZURE OF THE
PERSON
A.   Robinette’s Factual Background
On August 3, 1992, Deputy Roger Newsome of the Montgomery
County Sheriff’s Department was conducting a drug interdiction pa-
trol on Interstate 70 north of Dayton, Ohio.215 Deputy Newsome
clocked Robert D. Robinette driving his red Pontiac Firebird at sixty-
nine miles per hour in a forty-five-mile-per-hour construction zone.216
He therefore decided to follow his “routine practice regarding speed-
ers in that particular construction zone” of merely issuing a verbal
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warning.217 He stopped Robinette and requested and received his
driver’s license.218 A computer check revealed no prior violations.219
However, instead of simply giving the speeding warning to the mo-
torist as he sat in his car, Deputy Newsome asked Robinette to exit
his vehicle and stand between his Firebird and the patrol cruiser.220
Retaining Robinette’s license, Deputy Newsome returned to his
cruiser and activated the car’s video camera to videotape the encoun-
ter with Robinette.221 Deputy Newsome then handed back Robi-
nette’s license and issued his warning.222 However, he continued the
conversation as follows:
Officer Newsome: Okay. Since you live in Montgomery County, and
you’re almost at the end of your trip, I’m going to cut you some
slack. Okay?
Robinette: I didn’t see the sign was dropped down.
Officer Newsome: If you have been watching the news you know
we’ve been having a lot of problems with accidents up here, one
right after another. We just want to get everyone to slow down. We
have been writing a lot of tickets though. One question before you
get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car?
Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?223
Deputy Newsome later testified that his “only purpose” for acti-
vating the video camera was that “he was a member of a drug inter-
diction patrol, and he wanted to record his questioning of Robinette
regarding drugs, weapons and contraband.”224 Indeed, Deputy New-
some had performed a similar routine in requesting consent to
search in “786 traffic stops in 1992, the year of Robinette’s arrest.”225
Deputy Newsome’s reason for his habitual requests to search cars
was “more so for any other reason the fact that I need the practice, to
be quite honest.”226
When, “with no pause or break in the conversation,”227 Deputy
Newsome abruptly shifted subjects from speeding to contraband, he
caught Robinette off guard.228 Robinette denied having drugs or
weapons in his car.229 When Newsome then followed up by asking
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permission to search the vehicle, Robinette was “shocked” and
“automatically” answered “yes.”230 The resulting search revealed a
small amount of marijuana and a pill later determined to be methyl-
enedioxy methamphetamine (MDMA).231
B.   Every Lower Court in Robinette Considered the Scope of the
Seizure to Be the Determinative Issue in the Case
The discovery of illegal drugs in Robinette’s car led to his indict-
ment, his unsuccessful motion to suppress the evidence, and ulti-
mately to his “no contest” plea.232 In overruling the motion to sup-
press, the trial court focused on the scope of Deputy Newsome’s de-
tention of Robinette.233 The judge found that “the deputy made clear
to Robinette that the traffic matter was concluded before asking to
search the vehicle” and therefore the consent to search “did not re-
sult from any overbearing behavior on behalf of Newsome.”234 Thus,
at the very first hearing, the trial judge identified as the constitu-
tional battleground the boundaries of seizure of the person, and
whether or not that person was within those boundaries when con-
sent was solicited.235
When Robinette appealed his conviction, the Court of Appeals of
Ohio, Montgomery County, continued to focus on the proper scope of
the initial detention.236 The court noted, “He contends that once the
purpose for the investigative stop—in this case the issuance of a
warning for speeding—had been satisfied, the officer could not law-
fully detain him further for the purpose of securing his consent to
search for narcotics. We agree.”237
Relying on this argument as the “sole Assignment of Error,” the
court of appeals concluded:
[A] reasonable person in Robinette’s position would not believe
that the investigative stop had been concluded, and that he or she
was free to go, so long as the police officer was continuing to ask
investigative questions. . . . Because the search in the case before
us resulted from an unlawful detention, it is the fruit of an unlaw-
ful seizure.238
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Likewise, the Supreme Court of Ohio viewed the continued legal-
ity of the detention as the crux of this case: “We find that the search
was invalid since it was the product of an unlawful seizure.”239 In
fact, recognizing that Robinette’s detention began legally, the state
supreme court pinpointed the relevant inquiry: “The question is
when the validity of that stop ceased.”240 Justice Pfeifer, writing for
the majority, regarded the marijuana and MDMA as illegally recov-
ered not because of some flaw within the consent itself, but due to
the context within which the consent was obtained.241 Deputy New-
some had, with neither reason nor articulable facts, “extended his
detention of Robinette by ordering him out of the vehicle. . . . There-
fore the detention of Robinette ceased being legal when Newsome
asked him to leave his vehicle.”242 The Ohio Supreme Court thus
concluded: “Because Robinette’s consent was obtained during an il-
legal detention, his consent is invalid unless the state proves that
the consent was not the product of the illegal detention but the re-
sult of an independent act of free will.”243 Justice Pfeifer noted that
several facts, such as the lack of a “time lapse” between the illegal
detention and the request to search, the deputy’s prefacing his re-
quest to search with the phrase “before you get gone,” and most
people’s belief that an officer’s continued interrogation signals con-
tinued custody, caused this case to be “an example of the blurring be-
tween a legal detention and an attempt at consensual interaction.”244
The state supreme court cogently identified the danger involved:
The transition between detention and a consensual exchange can
be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice that it has
occurred. The undetectability of that transition may be used by
police officers to coerce citizens into answering questions that they
need not answer, or to allow a search of a vehicle that they are not
legally obligated to allow.245
Thus, the court felt a “need for this court to draw a bright line be-
tween the conclusion of a valid seizure and the beginning of a con-
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sensual exchange.”246 Justice Pfeifer therefore crafted a rule to ad-
dress the concerns of police overreaching due to the citizenry’s igno-
rance of the absence of detention:
[T]o be secure in one’s person and property requires that citizens
stopped for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the detaining of-
ficer when they are free to go after a valid detention, before an offi-
cer attempts to engage in a consensual interrogation. Any attempt
at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase “At
this time you legally are free to go” or by words of similar im-
port.247
Justice Pfeifer’s warning requirement was not created in a vac-
uum. The state supreme court had just witnessed the government’s
claim that a reasonable person who is caught speeding by a patrol-
ling sheriff, ordered out of the car, and videotaped while asked “One
question before you get gone: are you carrying any illegal contraband
in your car?,” would feel free to just drive away.248 The state court,
therefore, established their warning rule in the hope of preventing
officers from transforming initially legal traffic stops into “fishing
expedition[s] for unrelated criminal activity.”249
C.   The Robinette Court’s Ruling and Rationale
As previously noted, in the very first court in which this case was
heard, the parties and courts uniformly drew the battle lines at the
issue of the continuing validity of Deputy Newsome’s seizure of
Robinette. Indeed, before this case reached the United States Su-
preme Court, each court that passed on the matter felt compelled to
directly address the legality of the search in this case in terms of the
proper scope of the accompanying Fourth Amendment seizure.250
Even the United States Supreme Court itself recognized the signifi-
cance of the seizure question, stating, “We believe the issue as to the
continuing legality of the detention is a ‘predicate to an intelligent
resolution’ of the question presented, and therefore ‘fairly included
therein.’ The parties have briefed this issue, and we proceed to de-
cide it.”251 Yet, the Court then went on to dodge this issue.
In the very first paragraph after the Court’s rendition of the
case’s facts and procedural history, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused
on the state supreme court’s warning requirement that “[a]ny at-
tempt at consensual interrogation must be preceded by the phrase
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‘At this time you legally are free to go’ or by words of similar im-
port.”252 He then isolated this portion of the state court opinion by
announcing the Court’s grant of certiorari “to review this per se rule,
and we now reverse.”253 By such selective citation, Chief Justice
Rehnquist placed the lower court’s ruling in a false light. He dis-
torted Justice Pfiefer’s reasoning into nothing more than a call for a
warning requirement for consent to search.
Robinette’s articulation of the issue thus glossed over the true
area of dispute: the continuing lawfulness of Deputy Newsome’s sei-
zure of Robinette. As previously indicated, a closer look at the Ohio
Supreme Court opinion reveals that the majority’s primary concern
was the illegality of the continued detention.254 In fact, its first ruling
was focused not on the warning mandate but on the “continued de-
tention of a person stopped for a traffic violation.”255 Further, the
first conclusion mentioned in Justice Pfeifer’s opinion concerned the
unlawfulness of the seizure: “We find that the search was invalid
since it was the product of an unlawful seizure.”256 Although in the
next sentence Justice Pfiefer did indeed establish the “bright-line”
warning requirement for “any consensual interrogation,” he devoted
virtually all of his remaining opinion to the difficulties in determin-
ing the end-point of a seizure during a traffic stop.257 The warning
requirement had no purpose in and of itself. The Ohio Supreme
Court established it as a response to the coercive effects of an ille-
gally extended seizure.258 Yet, Chief Justice Rehnquist failed to rec-
ognize the broader context of the Ohio Supreme Court’s warning
rule.259 By narrowing the scope of the state supreme court’s reason-
ing, Robinette set up a “warning-is-required-for-consent” straw man
that it could easily knock down without addressing the troubling
concerns underlying the state court ruling. This, in turn, obscured
Justice Rehnquist’s dodge of the case’s true issue.
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s sidestep is illustrated by a yawning gap
in the Robinette opinion. In considering the legality of the “continued
detention,” the Court began by addressing the propriety of stopping
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Robinette in the first place.260 There was “admitted probable cause to
stop Robinette for speeding.”261 Further, in light of this probable
cause for the stop, “Deputy Newsome was objectively justified in
asking Robinette to get out of the car.”262 Of course, the conclusions
that probable cause supports a traffic stop and that officers may or-
der the driver out of a lawfully stopped vehicle cover no new ground.
Nonetheless, the Court took pains to decide these non-issues.
At this point in the analysis, the Court had Robinette out of his
car, standing between his Firebird and the police cruiser, and pre-
sumably listening to Deputy Newsome’s concerns for accidents on
that stretch of highway.263 The Court had arrived at the core of the
Fourth Amendment problem posed by the facts: Was the continued
detention of Robinette reasonable, either as a pure consensual en-
counter or as a justified extension of the original detention? Seem-
ingly sensing this, the Court stated, “We now turn to the merits of
the question presented.”264 Then, it offered nothing.
The Court’s failure to confront the seizure issue was apparent
from the very start of its discussion of the “merits of the question
presented.”265 The “merits” of Robinette began, “We have long held
that the ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.’”266
Chief Justice Rehnquist lifted this language from Florida v.
Jimeno,267 a case concerning not the seizure of a person, but the
separate issue of the scope of consent to search.268 Thus, in the first
words of his analysis of the merits, Chief Justice Rehnquist tele-
graphed his view that Robinette was nothing more than a consent
case.269 Any meaningful “seizure of the person” reasoning was there-
fore short-circuited before it even began.
Chief Justice Rehnquist then dutifully cited the series of cases in
which the Court defined a seizure of the person.270 Yet, the Court
then employed none of these authorities to answer whether Robi-
nette was indeed seized at the very moment Deputy Newsome said,
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“before you get gone.”271 Instead, Robinette spent two paragraphs
blandly stating that the “endless variations” of facts involved in
these encounters necessitated that the Court eschew “bright-line
rules” in favor of a “totality of the circumstances” approach to rea-
sonableness.272
Of course, the totality of the circumstances rule was crafted to
allow the Court to determine the existence of a seizure itself. How-
ever, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not then actually apply all the facts
to see if Deputy Newsome did in fact continue to seize Robinette
when he was asking him about contraband in his car. Instead, he
entirely skipped over the seizure, the primary issue, to rule on the
voluntariness question of the resulting consent.273 Thus, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s language about favoring the “traditional contextual ap-
proach” instead of a rigid “per se rule” allowed the Court to go off on
a tangent about the Court’s previous rejection of per se rules in the
consent context.274 Indeed, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,275 a case cited
by Robinette for its rejection of per se rules, was a consent case.276
Once the Court launched on the secondary discussion of consent, any
opportunity to provide guidance on seizure was lost.
The shifting of battlegrounds to a discussion of warning require-
ments for consent to search spelled doom for any thoughtful weigh-
ing of the facts surrounding Deputy Newsome’s inquiries about guns
and drugs in Robinette’s car. Robinette simply equated the Ohio Su-
preme Court’s “you legally are free to go” warning with the “you have
a right to refuse to consent” warning it rejected in Schneckloth.277
This enabled Chief Justice Rehnquist to couch the rest of the major-
ity opinion in voluntariness of consent terms.278 The result was an
opinion, having come to the very brink of addressing the crucial
point in the case, detouring into an irrelevant discussion regarding
the undesirability of warnings for consent to search.279
The opportunity to provide lower courts with guidance on “the
continuing legality of the detention,” which was the issue the Court
had itself deemed “predicate to an intelligent resolution of the ques-
tion presented,” was thus never actually handled. Or, perhaps it
was. By going directly to the consent issue, especially after mention-
ing the importance of the continued validity of the detention, Robi-
nette signaled in deeds, more powerfully than in words, that the de-
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tention here lacked any constitutional significance.280 Therefore, the
Court created an unprecedented extension of government power to
control physically persons of the citizenry.281 There now appears to
be an undefined window of time, after an officer has completed the
duties demanded of the stop, when law enforcement may maintain
contact with a citizen without constitutional justification.
Such a gap in Fourth Amendment coverage was precisely the evil
the Court aimed to prevent decades ago in Terry.282 When offered the
option of defining a stop or frisk as activity falling “outside the pur-
view of the Fourth Amendment,”283 the Terry Court “emphatically”
rejected the notion, prophetically fearing that such logic “seeks to
isolate from constitutional scrutiny the initial stages of the contact
between the policeman and the citizen.”284 Curiously, what the Court
once so loudly guarded from “the unbridled discretion of law en-
forcement officials,”285 it now casually handed over without the utter-
ing of even one relevant word. Every motorist’s constitutional pro-
tection from unconstrained official discretion upon an officer’s com-
pletion of the task of a traffic stop has ended not just without a bang
but without even a whimper.
D.   Finishing the Court’s Incompleted Task: Assessing Whether
Robinette Was Seized at the Time He Consented to the Search Under
Either the “Totality of the Circumstances” or the “Bright-Line”
Approaches
1.   Applying the Totality of the Circumstances Test to Deputy
Newsome’s Actions
Robinette was indeed seized when Deputy Newsome pulled his
Firebird over to issue a traffic warning.286 The question is whether
Robinette remained seized at the moment he was asked to allow a
search of his car. Since there exists no Supreme Court holding di-
rectly addressing the termination point of a seizure of the person,
the closest pertinent rules regard the definition of a seizure itself. As
previously indicated, the Court, in precedent stretching from
Mendenhall through Bostick, has determined the existence of sei-
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zures by assessing how a “reasonable person” in the individual’s
shoes would view all of the circumstances.287
A full application of this totality of the circumstances test in this
case indicates that Robinette remained seized when he consented to
a search of his vehicle. The first relevant fact is the prior existence of
a seizure of Robinette’s person. The very fact of a pre-existing seizure
enhanced the police dominance of the situation, and, therefore, in-
creased the potency of all the other factors pointing toward the re-
striction of Robinette’s liberty.288 Not only was Robinette stopped, he
had been advised by an officer in a marked patrol cruiser that the
officer observed him violate the law. Since the Court has seen the
lack of uniforms as a factor demonstrating the consensualness of an
encounter,289 it is fair to assume that the display of authority in the
form of a police cruiser would point toward a restriction of liberty.
Moreover, the Court has viewed officers’ advising a person of their
identity as narcotics agents, and of their suspicion that the person
was violating narcotics laws, as relevant facts weighing toward de-
tention.290 In Robinette, although Deputy Newsome never flatly said
that he suspected Robinette of drug possession, he directly told this
motorist that he had seen him exceed the speed limit.291 He thus es-
tablished his power to punish Robinette, however minimally, with a
ticket.
Further, Deputy Newsome did not simply speak to Robinette as
the driver sat in his car. Instead, Deputy Newsome had Robinette
exit his vehicle.292 While this order is fully consistent with Mimms, it
also shifts control away from the driver to the officer.293 No longer
could Robinette simply turn the ignition key and drive away. In-
stead, in order to leave, he had to affirmatively reverse an action
previously requested by the officer—he had to get back into his car.
However, Deputy Newsome did more than merely have Robinette
step out of his Firebird. He directed Robinette to stand in between
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his car and the cruiser.294 When an officer tells a motorist to stand in
a particular spot, a reasonable person not only complies, but does so
until told otherwise.295
Add to these circumstances the fact that the officer turned on a
video camera.296 Reasonable people are fully aware that cameras
preserve every movement and word that takes place in front of their
lenses. Such recording devices create a certain formal atmosphere
because they convey the idea that the scene is important enough to
preserve. Persons who are not experts in all the nuances of the
Fourth Amendment may hesitate to act in their own interests while
being filmed, for they would not wish any error to be permanently
recorded. Cameras therefore create a potential to chill the exercise of
constitutional rights.
Deputy Newsome did return Robinette’s license, a factor that has
weighed in favor of the consensual nature of an encounter.297 How-
ever, the timing of the return is itself significant. Deputy Newsome
handed back the license after he had formalized the encounter by
activating the video camera.298 Now, if Robinette wished to leave, he
would have to do so on camera without any signal that he was free to
go. A reasonable person might be concerned that walking away on
camera might signal for an official record a consciousness of guilt.
Further, Deputy Newsome’s words speak volumes:
Officer Newsome: Okay. Since you live in Montgomery County, and
you’re almost at the end of your trip, I’m going to cut you some
slack. Okay?
Robinette: I didn’t see the sign was dropped down.
Officer Newsome: If you have been watching the news you know
we’ve been having a lot of problems with accidents up here, one
right after another. We just want to get everyone to slow down. We
have been writing a lot of tickets though. One question before you
get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car?
Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?299
In this brief exchange, Deputy Newsome seemingly carefully
chose his words and actions in order to establish an atmosphere con-
ducive to his drug investigation. After all, contrary to what he told
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Robinette, Deputy Newsome did not stop Robinette in order to give
him a traffic citation, for he had decided even before he approached
Robinette’s vehicle to issue only a verbal warning.300 In fact, his job
description at the time he spotted Robinette’s car was as “drug in-
terdiction patrol.”301 Deputy Newsome himself gave as his “only pur-
pose” for activating the video camera that “he was a member of a
drug interdiction patrol, and he wanted to record his questioning of
Robinette regarding drugs, weapons and contraband.”302
Of course, the Court has emphatically held that an officer’s sub-
jective motivations for his actions are simply irrelevant for Fourth
Amendment purposes, as the true measure of constitutionality in
this area of law is objective reasonableness. However, the facts in
this case show that Deputy Newsome’s aims hit their target. He had
indeed created an atmosphere where a reasonable person would not
feel comfortable refusing his requests. In fact, he had established
such a setting 786 times in one year.303 According to Deputy New-
some’s own testimony, he had requested consent to search in “786
traffic stops in 1992, the year of Robinette’s arrest.”304 It strains logic
to assume that 786 motorists, many of whom were probably stopped
for speeding, would allow for the delay entailed in a search of their
cars when they reasonably believed they were simply free to leave.305
Deputy Newsome offered as the reason for his routine requests to
search motorists’ cars: “more so for any other reason the fact that I
need the practice, to be quite honest.”306 Given the simplicity and in-
formality of a request for consent to search, one might wonder what
exactly was needed to be practiced in seeking consent to search? Cer-
tainly, even the dimmest officer would get a handle on this procedure
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after performing it an average of more than twice a day in the course
of a year.
Perhaps the true need for practice is in the set up of the driver.
Deputy Newsome never mentioned to Robinette that his primary
reason for questioning him was his need to sharpen his drug inter-
diction skills. Instead, he led this motorist to believe that the reason
for the stop was highway safety. The deputy went so far as to refer to
accident reports on the news and the fact that police have been
“writing a lot of tickets.”307 One could assume that a reasonable per-
son, taking the deputy’s words at face value, would consider the pur-
pose of the encounter to be traffic safety. Having lulled the motorist
into a false sense of security by leaving the impression that the focus
of law enforcement interest is only safe driving, Deputy Newsome
also reminded Robinette of his discretion over him by stating that he
was cutting him “some slack.”308 This false favor was supported by an
equally artificial rationale: that Deputy Newsome was refraining
from writing a ticket because the motorist was “almost at the end of
[his] trip.”309 Since Deputy Newsome had already decided to issue
only a warning before he approached Robinette’s car, he therefore
had chosen to forgo writing a ticket even before he learned of Robi-
nette’s home address from his license. The result of this ruse is the
creation of a false sense of security on the part of the reasonable mo-
torist in order to lay the groundwork for the request for consent.
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the reasonable
person envisioned by the Fourth Amendment is “an innocent per-
son.”310 Arguably, an innocent person would not have violated the
traffic laws, and therefore would not be vulnerable to the officer’s
discretion in writing a ticket. This would remove any coercive impact
caused by Deputy Newsome’s off-handed mention of writing “a lot of
tickets” and his practiced request for consent. The problem of such
reasoning is that it quickly loses relevance when applied to the vast
majority of stopped motorists. In order to stop a driver, police must
have an objectively reasonable basis for the seizure.311 Most roadside
stops are based upon a traffic violation. Therefore, most motorists
finding themselves in Robinette’s situation will not be wholly inno-
cent; they will have committed some kind of traffic infraction and
thus keenly fall under the discretionary power of the official who has
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pulled them over. A strict application of the reasonable person stan-
dard as a wholly innocent person would cause the Court’s test to en-
tirely detach from the reality faced by every motorist properly
stopped for a traffic violation. Therefore, it would seem that in order
to preserve the purpose of the reasonable person test in placing the
reasonable person in the individual motorist’s actual situation,
complete innocence, even of traffic violations, could not be a work-
able standard. However, by failing to address the scope of Deputy
Newsome’s seizure of Robinette, the Court has created yet another
gap in guidance.
Such a void is especially problematic in light of the Bostick
Court’s pronouncement that “an individual may decline an officer’s
request without fearing prosecution” for “[w]e have consistently held
that a refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the mini-
mal level of objective justification needed for a detention or sei-
zure.”312 Of course, failure to cooperate with a seemingly simple re-
quest to search may be seen as ungrateful in the face of an officer’s
mercy in foregoing writing a ticket. Again, the Court’s earlier pro-
nouncements upon the relative positions of power between officer
and citizen are found lacking in the context of the typical traffic stop.
Still more facts must be considered in the totality of Robinette’s
circumstances. Deputy Newsome conveyed both his power and his
mercy in not following the usual practice of writing yet another of
the whole “lot of tickets.” Then, “with no pause or break in the con-
versation,”313 he abruptly shifted gears to an inquiry about drugs and
weapons, in order to catch the motorist off guard. It worked. When
Newsome asked whether any contraband was in the car, Robinette
answered “No.”314 When Newsome then followed up by asking per-
mission to search the vehicle, Robinette was “shocked” and
“automatically” answered “Yes.”315 The resulting search revealed a
small amount of marijuana and a pill later determined to be
MDMA.316 Again, the subjective impressions of the individual are not
directly relevant factors in measuring the impact of the totality of
the circumstances upon the reasonable person.317 However, the spe-
cifics of Deputy Newsome’s practiced request for consent, along with
a track record of 786 successful requests to consent, tellingly prove
that Robinette’s feelings were not unreasonable.
                                                                                                                   
312. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437.
313. State v. Robinette, No. 94-14074, 1994 WL 147806, at *1 (Ohio App. 2d Apr. 15,
1994).
314. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 696 (Ohio 1995).
315. ACLU Brief, supra note 215, at 2.
316. See Robinette, 653 N.E.2d at 696.
317. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-36.
1998]           FOURTH AMENDMENT AND MOTORISTS 561
Furthermore, the Deputy’s own words would indicate to a reason-
able listener that Robinette was not yet free to go. Deputy Newsome
phrased his question in such a manner as to compel a response from
anyone who wished to leave. The Supreme Court of Ohio recognized
as much:
Newsome then said, “One question before you get gone: are you car-
rying any illegal contraband in your car?” (Emphasis added.) New-
some tells Robinette that before he leaves Newsome wants to know
whether Robinette is carrying any contraband. Newsome does not
ask if he may ask a question, he simply asks it, implying that
Robinette must respond before he may leave.318
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens recognized the accumu-
lated power of each of the circumstances surrounding Robinette’s
consent.319 He agreed with the Ohio Supreme Court that reasonable
persons would assume they were validly in an officer’s custody for
the duration of the officer’s interview.320 However, as previously
noted in Part II.A., applying the totality of the circumstances test
literally, by assessing all the facts taken together, does not follow Su-
preme Court precedent. Delgado isolated as “pivotal” the factor that
INS agents were stationed at the factory exits;321 Chesternut distilled
the facts before it to merely a “brief acceleration to catch up with re-
spondent, followed by a short drive alongside him;”322 and Bostick
removed the rider from the bus and placed him in the terminal.323 In
Robinette, it is not known how the Court would have grouped the
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facts, for it simply failed to perform a totality of the circumstances
analysis.
Further, the Court has repeatedly indicated that the totality of
the circumstances rule requires a weighing not only of the facts that
surrounded the individual, but also those that did not.324 Indeed, the
Court has found the absence of various factors to be relevant to the
issue regarding the existence of a seizure. In Mendenhall, Justice
Stewart found it significant that the agents in that case did not wear
uniforms, did not display weapons, and did not summon the defen-
dant to them but instead approached her.325 Likewise, the Court in
Chesternut found the lack of sirens and flashers, a command to halt,
the display of weapons, and the operation of the police car in an
“aggressive manner” as relevant to the seizure issue.326 Finally, the
Bostick Court considered the fact that officers did not point guns at
the defendant nor “otherwise threaten him” as important in deter-
mining the nonexistence of a seizure in that case.327
In Robinette, the Court’s absence-of-factors analysis tends to re-
sult in a wash. While it is true that Deputy Newsome did not point a
gun at Robinette, drive his cruiser in an “aggressive manner,” or
“otherwise threaten” Robinette, he did in essence command Robi-
nette to stop by pulling him over in his cruiser. Thus, the absence-of-
factors analysis does nothing to alter the conclusion that Robinette
was still seized under the totality of the circumstances when he was
asked to consent to a search of his Firebird.
The totality of the circumstances analysis would not be complete
without a consideration of the level of intimidation necessary to con-
stitute a seizure. The Court in Chesternut allowed police to commit
acts that were “somewhat intimidating” and still not trigger consti-
tutional scrutiny.328 Additional facts, such as the activation of sirens
or flashing lights, or the display of weapons, would have to be added
to driving alongside a running pedestrian in order to reach the in-
timidation threshold.329 The Bostick Court found the lack of threats
with a gun to be relevant for seizure purposes.330 Again, without
guidance from the Court, we are left with a mixed message from
Deputy Newsome. Certainly, he did not draw his weapon or act in a
threatening or even rude manner. However, his behavior included
facts demonstrating seizure in Chesternut: lights and, with his
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“before you get gone” words, an “attempt to . . . intrude upon [a per-
son’s] freedom of movement.”331
Thus, without the benefit of an explicit ruling by the Court, a bal-
ance of all the facts surrounding Robinette’s consent tilt toward the
existence of a seizure of his person. Therefore, Robinette’s failure to
address this issue is at best unhelpful, and at worst misleading. Af-
ter all, the Court’s rush to the consent issue creates a negative impli-
cation that no seizure of Robinette’s person occurred at the time
Deputy Newsome sought his consent.
2.   Applying Hodari’s Bright-Line Test to Deputy Newsome’s and
Robinette’s Actions
As noted in Part II.B., in Hodari, Justice Scalia offered an alter-
native definition for seizure of the person. In bright-line fashion,
Justice Scalia crafted two ways to seize a person: officers could affect
a seizure either by “physical force” or by show of authority along
with “submission to the assertion of authority.”332 No facts in Robi-
nette indicate that Deputy Newsome physically restrained Robinette
at the time he requested consent to search his car. However, the rec-
ord in Robinette does indicate not only that Robinette submitted to
Deputy Newsome’s authority, but that he repeatedly did so over the
course of the traffic stop.333 Further, Robinette was still submitting to
Deputy Newsome’s authority at the moment the officer asked for
permission to search the vehicle. Deputy Newsome demonstrated his
authority, and Robinette his submission, with the traffic stop itself.
Deputy Newsome again showed his authority when he asked Robi-
nette to step out of his Firebird. Robinette submitted to this addi-
tional official command. The Deputy asserted still more official
authority in having Robinette stand between his Firebird and the
police cruiser. Robinette offered still more submission in acceding to
this instruction. Indeed, each of Robinette’s additional actions—
handing over his license, allowing himself to be videotaped, offering
an explanation for his speeding—all indicate continued submission
to Deputy Newsome’s authority. Thus, with “no time lapse”334 be-
tween this pattern of submission and Deputy Newsome’s request to
search, it would appear that not only did this officer initially seize
Robinette, he continued to do so during his request for consent.
Thus, under either the Mendenhall/Bostick totality of the circum-
stances approach to determining a seizure, or under Hodari’s bright-
line test of seizure, Robinette was seized when he gave consent to
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search his car. This crucial link is simply missing from the Court’s
chain of analysis in Robinette. It is in this gap that police abuse may
occur. Thus, the Court should have formulated and applied a rule to
determine the constitutional significance of Deputy Newsome’s con-
duct.
IV.   ADDRESSING THE MOTORIST’S CENTRAL CONCERN: A PROPOSED
DEFINITION OF THE END-POINT OF SEIZURE OF THE PERSON
A.   A Proposed Rule for the Determination of the End of a Seizure
A review of the circumstances Robinette found himself in
prompted the following from the Ohio Supreme Court:
This case demonstrates the need for this court to draw a bright
line between the conclusion of a valid seizure and the beginning of
a consensual exchange . . . . The transition between detention and
a consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye
may not notice that it has occurred. The undetectability of that
transition may be used by police officers to coerce citizens into . . .
allow[ing] a search of a vehicle that they are not legally obligated
to allow.335
Contrary to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s protestations in Robinette,
such a rule would be consistent with much of the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment doctrine.336 The Fourth Amendment rules de-
signed to regulate police in their daily activities “ought to be ex-
pressed in terms that are readily applicable by the police in the con-
text of the law enforcement activities in which they are necessarily
engaged.”337 A bright-line rule determining the end point of a seizure
would benefit not only police in the field, but judges on the bench,
and ultimately individuals throughout the nation.
After all, the Court has invested decades in crafting rules identi-
fying the starting point of a seizure of the person, and in fact, in the
case of Hodari, has even established a bright-line rule as a defini-
tion. Consistency would seem to mandate at least some attention be
given to determining the other boundary of a seizure, its termina-
tion.
Since Hodari established with simple clarity that a seizure occurs
with either the application of official force or with the showing of
authority along with the individual’s submission to that show of
authority, this same rule could operate in the reverse to undo a sei-
zure. Under such an analysis, if the government could demonstrate
that at the relevant time period (here, the requesting of consent), the
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officer no longer restrained the citizen by either the “physical force”
or “submission to show of authority” prongs of the rule, then the in-
dividual would be deemed to no longer be seized. As for proving a
termination of the show of authority, the same kind of factual
analysis exercised to determine the start of a seizure could be used to
identify its end. Officers show authority by communicating in some
fashion that the individual must “Stop, in the name of the law!”338
Likewise, the end of a seizure would require a similar kind of com-
munication. If the Court can envision police communicating with
individuals to start a seizure, the same kind of conduct could not be
seen as too onerous to end a seizure. Indeed, this communication oc-
curs between police and citizens every day, when officers advise in-
dividuals that they are “free to go” or to “proceed on the highway.”
Rather than being an unfair burden upon officers, such a test ac-
tually strengthens law enforcement’s ability to control their encoun-
ters with individuals. Without a clear test, citizens may receive a
signal from the Robinette decision that once an officer takes a breath,
they can walk away. Officers might fear allowing themselves even a
moment of pause, for any hesitation could be a pretext for a motorist
to head for the car. Instead, compliance with lawful police orders
should be encouraged.339 This proposed test of the end point of a sei-
zure, based as it is on overt communication, clarifies the encounter
for the individual, thus allowing officers to maintain better control.
This test might incorrectly be construed as a version of the very
“warning” requirement for valid consent rejected by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Robinette.340 However, rather than being a requirement
for obtaining lawful consent, as presented in Robinette, this rule
would simply determine the end point of a seizure. Contrary to what
was envisioned in Robinette with its proposed per se requirement,
police could still obtain voluntary consent without providing any
warning. This is because police are able to obtain valid consent from
individuals every day, whether or not the persons are currently being
seized. After all, the key is not whether individuals who provide con-
sent are seized, but whether they are lawfully seized. Thus, police
could obtain valid consent from seized individuals, so long as these
citizens voluntarily consented to the search. Additionally, police
could obtain consent from people who are simply not seized.
Thus, the Court’s entire concern about unnecessarily creating a
“warning requirement”341 for consent was a red herring. The crucial
issue missed in Robinette dealt not with the resulting consent, but
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with the continuing seizure. By failing to target the correct question,
the Court missed the opportunity to clarify an area of the law suffer-
ing from uncertainty. The clear rule proposed here, based as it is on
empowering officers to define the boundaries of their seizures by
simply communicating with the citizens, could end much of this con-
fusion.
B.   A Proposed Rule for Determining the Legality of a Continuing
Detention
A clear and understandable rule for identifying a seizure’s conclu-
sion, however, does not provide a complete solution. Also needed is a
simple standard to determine the legality of any continuing deten-
tion. Fortunately, such a test is easily available. In fact, Justice Ste-
vens made reference to a common sense standard in his dissent: “As
an objective matter, it inexorably follows that when the officer had
completed his task of either arresting or reprimanding the driver of
the speeding car, his continued detention of that person constituted
an illegal seizure.”342 Thus, the end of a lawful seizure occurs upon
the officer’s “completion” of his or her “task.” A citizen must be re-
leased from official authority once the original purpose of the seizure
has been accomplished,343 or when the legitimate duties triggered by
reasonable suspicion or probable cause that developed during the
duration of the seizure have been served.344
The advantages of this simple rule are manifest. First, the
“completion of task” test is easy for law enforcement to apply. Cer-
tainly, any reasonable officer should know, at the outset of any stop,
her purpose behind the seizure she is effectuating. In carrying out
her duties, the one guide already in any officer’s mind is the success-
ful completion of the task at hand. Merely limiting officers’ activities
to their legitimate tasks borders on stating the obvious. In fact, the
ease of application is demonstrated in Robinette itself. In its petition
for writ of certiorari, the government noted that the issue in this
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case involved activity “after the completion of the business of the
stop.”345
In contrast to the officer, the motorist lacks certainty as to the
“business” of the stop. Of course, a driver may know that he or she
was speeding or performed an illegal turn. Yet, recognizing that the
officer is an individual whose behavior can vary from other police or
with each traffic stop, the citizen does not know what will be the ul-
timate outcome of the seizure. Further, the traveling public is aware
that the officer on the beat has considerable discretion in deciding
whether to issue a citation or to grant mercy. The motorist’s fate may
be a mere warning or a ticket, or it may be a mistaken arrest or even
a roust. Moreover, typically being lay persons, drivers do not know
the exact boundaries of lawful police protocol. Thus, many individu-
als assume a somewhat passive role, dutifully reacting to official
demands for identification and registration, and quietly awaiting the
officer’s final decision. The “completion of task” rule therefore places
the burden of action on the party with the most knowledge, the offi-
cer. The police officer knows best the moment when her own task is
complete, and thus should be prohibited from intruding on the indi-
vidual for any amount of time after that goal is accomplished. This
rule also has the merit of avoiding the dangers of rigidity inherent in
a “bright-line” test. By this standard’s very definition, officers are
free to perform their duties as long as they have duties to perform.
The limit on authority will be tailored in every case because it is tied
to the determination of the task itself.
Finally, and most importantly, this “completion of task” rule
brings home the underlying theme of the Fourth Amendment itself
to law enforcement: governmental intrusion on the individual must
be limited to the original justification. Indeed, the “completion of
task” limit is hardly revolutionary. The Terry Court presented a
version of it in its discussion of the proper scope of both seizures and
searches: “[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were
‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual one—whether the officer’s action
was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place.”346 Moreover, a plurality of the Court articulated a form of
it specifically in reference to seizures of the person in 1982: “This
much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be tempo-
rary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of
the stop.”347 Chief Justice Rehnquist himself joined a majority opin-
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ion adopting this language.348 Therefore, this rule sounds a value
basic to Fourth Amendment law: that government should intrude
upon our privacy and security only so much as is necessary for it to
do its job.
V.   CONCLUSION
When considering the nation as a whole, perhaps most people will
never suffer an arrest, or have their house searched pursuant to a
warrant. Although more common, most individuals will not experi-
ence a car search, or even be confronted with a request to search
their vehicle. Yet, by the end of their driving careers, many motorists
will probably at some time see that flashing light in their rearview
mirror. Every stopped driver, the innocent as well as the guilty, will
ponder some form of the following question: “When will the officer let
me go?” Even though the Court has addressed the rarer events of ar-
rest and search, it chose to dodge the one practical question upper-
most in any detained person’s mind: “When will this traffic stop
end?”
This is no minor omission. The Supreme Court itself has charac-
terized the unique value protected by the Fourth Amendment as “the
concern of our society for the right of each individual to be let
alone.”349 Therefore, the central concern of the stopped driver of
“When will this traffic stop end?” is really a specific articulation of a
more general question: “When will society’s concern for each of us to
be left alone reattach?” After all, if “[n]o right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and un-
questionable authority of law,”350 should not the boundaries of such a
sacred guarantee be jealously guarded?
Yet the Court left its post. Robinette failed to answer the question
put squarely to it by Deputy Newsome’s practiced delivery of his con-
sent request. In turning a blind eye to the crucial issue of the seizure
of Robinette’s person, the Court caused a breach to form in the de-
fense of the Fourth Amendment’s basic right of personal security.
                                                                                                                   
348. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 684 (1984).
349. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242 (1973).
350. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891)).
